The goal of this article is to describe an approach that can be used to specify secrets or credentials without ever writing them in configuration files. Moreover, the proposed approach is meant to be non-restrictive, compatible with most popular secrets management tools and still offer easy implementation for teams that do not have the budget or the incentive to setup more complicated solutions. Finally, this approach re-use a very powerful abstraction that has been proved to work extremely well, the “object name”.
It is important to specified that this article do not try to define how to securely store passwords, how to securely exchange them, how to securely manage access rights, but rather propose a scheme that would improve interoperability of software.
Most software having some kind of authorization usually need secrets specified somewhere. Consider the following scenario. You write a service that output some logs and you want to re-use the well proven technology of Filebeat to write the logs from a file to an Elasticsearch Database. If you use authentication, you may need to specify a password somewhere, but will almost certainly have to specify some kind of secret. This is usually done in the configuration file.
There is several problems here.
From the point of view of Filebeat developers, it make perfect sense. The configuration files is what hold the variable controlled by the users. I can appreciate the reason, but I still think that storing secrets in a configuration file is a broken approach and I will try to explore an alternative way that would solve this problem, but that would also be easy and powerful.
My approach is to list some observations I have down during my work with this problem and try to use those observations to construct a scheme with the learning.
Several solutions to better manage secrets exists. Vault by HashiCorp, Azure Key Vault and AWS Key Management Service to name a few. Those solutions are rather complex solutions that also offer far more powerful features. Secrets rotation, access right management, single use secrets, and more. Where large team will want to leverage those features it can be an important burden for smaller team or for young project. Moreover, experience shows that currently very few 3rd party project support those different providers well.
Other simpler approach exists. One particularly interesting is Mozilla SOPS which also have a lot of similarities with Ansible Vault. Those two solutions are quite interesting, but also fairly inconvenient to use.
First of all, the files need to be pre-process before being use. Where this can be acceptable when using a software that only accept unencrypted secrets in the configuration file, it’s particularly annoying when you own software could read and decrypt the file automatically.
Secondly, it’s not compatible with other approaches making it harder to update or potentially use two different solutions. Indeed, my first observation is that the use cases for developers and for servers is drastically different.
Let’s start by looking at this from a server perspective.
What is the point to have accounts if I have N servers using the exact same account? Then it mostly boils down to the secret and a certificate is a convenient way to store a very long secret. Moreover, in this case, it’s common to specify the path to the private key in the configuration file. Including the private key in the configuration file (e.g. with PEM encoding) would violate my second observation.
If we are going to fit with my second observation, we won’t be able to specify the secrets in the configuration file. Yet, we still need to specify the secret somehow. So, let’s define the Secret Name with the following properties:
/, hyphen -, underscore _ and period.Example of valid secret name:
This can generally be understood as path, slightly more restrictive and compatible with URL, object store, file path, object name (e.g. named pipe) and more.
This article do not want to define how to retrieve the secrets, because it would simply not achieve what it’s trying to do. If that was the goal, we could simply refer to existing solutions. Yet, to explain the rational of the secret name format we can look at multiple potential secret providers.
Note that one goal of the format is to be able to seemingly switch between providers where one could be use by developers and an other by servers.
First of all, let’s consider the provider which is the file system starting
at the directory $secrets. The secret uat/db-writer would be the content
of the file $secrets/uat/db-writer. For now, do not consider the format of
the file, we will comeback to that in a later section.
Using the filesystem may not be ideal, but is actually far more powerful than one might think. For instance, you could leverage Windows Active Directory technology in combination with Shared resource.
Let’s say $secret is \\company.com\ProgramX\secrets, the path to the
secret with name uat/db-writer would be \\company.com\ProgramX\secrets\uat\db-writer.
In such case, Active Directories Security Groups
could be used.
This can be even more powerful on Windows if a service run as a service
account that has read writes on \\company.com\ProgramX\secrets\prod\, but
where developers do not.
Finally, it’s important to notice that connecting to your Windows account would “reveal” all secrets you have access to and also allow for secrets rotation.
An other usage of the file system can be interesting. Let’s assume that a
team is using Git and wants to version it’s secrets
as part of the repo which is cloned at the directory $repo.
First of all, an initial assumption is that secrets shouldn’t and aren’t saved as plain text in Git. The tools git-crypt and git-secret can be of utility in that regard.
Then, you can re-use the filesystem provider on the decrypted directory.
Using encrypted Zip archive can be quite interesting if you already have the code necessary to work with Zip archives, including encryption. Indeed, the provider can open the encrypted archive and simply use it as a filesystem.
Note that although it would work with Git, it’s not ideal, because it’s not Git friendly as in it’s not text based and although you know when at least one secret change, you don’t know which secret changed. This is the result of using a single binary file.
Similar advantage and problem would exists if you were using a KeePass database and the library to programmatically read it.
{
"uat/db-writer": {
"username": "db-writer",
"password": "Passw0rd!"
},
"uat/db-reader": {
"username": "db-reader",
"password": "pASSW0RD!"
}
}
I’m not sure why this would be better than file, but not that if you want to version it in Git with git-crypt or git-secret, you will loose the ability of knowing which secret was modified. You will simply be able to know that at least one was modified.
All previous example are generally easy to implement, but the nice thing about the proposed format is that it’s compatible with popular Key Management Service.
Vault and AWS KMS works similarly. I won’t dive too much in, because they are so much more than a simple secrets provider. Nonetheless, what is interesting for this article is that you can do REST requests to read the secrets. See the API here. Moreover, the server response is usually JSON formatted which we will comeback to in the next section.
Until now, we didn’t specify what should be the format of the request. We described how from a single secret name format, we could use different providers to “read” the secret. Similarly as for the providers, this doesn’t need to be answered by this document, because the implementation could be different. Nonetheless, I will recommend to use the JSON format.
First of all it’s a structured format that will allow you to support all potential secret type. Secondly, if you ever choose to move to a Key Management Service and use REST request, you will almost certainly use the JSON format.
While the propose approach doesn’t prevent nor force implementation to support several providers, we can look at the advantages and disadvantages of doing so.
First of all, we can try to think of example where it would be useful. I have one very simple use cases in mind. Consider wanting to use a encrypted zip archive for secret provider as described earlier. I use the encrypted zip as an example, because it’s easier, but the main use case would be with a Key Management Service. This encrypted archive will need a password to be open. Where should this password live? Including it in the configuration files would go against the observations made earlier. This seem to be a case where a generalization to support multiple providers make sense. It’s not strictly necessary as an application could assume the file system provider, but it might not be too hard to support multiple providers in this case. One of the difficulty in this case is how do you specify which providers need to be used?
During this article we looked at several very concrete implementations of providers. The goal of this article isn’t to ask projects to implement those different providers and especially not to ask to implement all of them.
The main goal is to ask projects to never ask users to specify secrets in the configuration files. Instead, ask for the secret name and document how your provider work. In many case, a filesystem providers will be more than enough, because it’s easy for a tool to use their own provider to download files before installing or starting a 3rd party tool. In fact, tools that request secrets in the configuration file forces users to consider the all configuration file as a secret or to manually parser and re-write the configuration file.